I. INTRODUCTION
T he asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is a universal feature of corporate income tax systems. Corporations incur tax liability if profi table, but they generally do not receive a commensurate refund if they report a tax loss. Corporations must carry tax losses backward or forward in time to offset prior payments (immediately) or reduce future tax liability. Because most corporations carry tax losses forward, they receive only a partial refund of their real tax loss. Moreover, loss carryforward fi rms can experience lengthy non-taxable spells that create effective tax rate disparities between those fi rms and their taxable counterparts. This potential outcome is highly relevant for researchers interested in the corporate investment process because loss and loss carryforward fi rms undertake signifi cant investment. For example, in 2004 , tax data reveal that these fi rms reported nearly 70 percent of total corporate investment.
The signifi cance of tax asymmetry for tax status and investment is underscored by the extensive literature that explores this issue. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) fi nd that tax asymmetry contributes to signifi cant variation in the marginal cost of debt across Michael G. Cooper: US Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20020 (michael.cooper@do.treas.gov) Matthew J. Knittel: US Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20020 (matthew.knittel@do.treas.gov) industries. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Mintz (1988) fi nd that loss carryforwards can have a dramatic effect on investment incentives in cyclical industries. Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) show that partial refunding increases the persistence of non-taxable status and creates effective tax rate disparities between taxable and non-taxable fi rms. Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) fi nd that tax asymmetry causes considerable cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in the cost of capital for UK manufacturing fi rms, although the explicit modeling of tax asymmetry did not improve the explanatory power of their investment equations. By contrast, Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1995) show that U.S. fi rms with no loss carryforwards are responsive to changes in the user cost of capital, but loss carryfoward fi rms are not. Most recently, Gendron, Anderson and Mintz (2003) fi nd that the investment behavior of Canadian fi rms is sensitive to tax status.
We extend this literature by examining the implications of tax asymmetry for U.S. corporations for 1993-2004. Compared to prior studies, we employ a much larger dataset that captures the majority of tax losses reported by corporations for the period analyzed. Another unique feature of our dataset is that it includes new fi rms and fi rms that terminate operations. These attributes allow us to compare the implications of tax asymmetry for new fi rms relative to older, established fi rms. We can also quantify the magnitude of tax losses that are never used by expired fi rms. Overall, we fi nd that partial refunding erodes the real value of tax losses by slightly more than one-half. Our results show that the negative consequences of tax asymmetry are not borne uniformly, as service industries and new fi rms are penalized disproportionately. On average, such fi rms endure relatively long delays in realizing losses, and in many cases are simply unable to use losses as an offset against taxable income. We also fi nd that tax asymmetry produces modest effective tax rate differentials between taxable and non-taxable fi rms within and across industries. For equipment investment, tax rate differentials increase signifi cantly if fi rms use debt fi nancing or utilize an investment tax credit.
Section II begins our analysis with a brief overview of the partial tax loss refund system. Section III presents our dataset and the methodologies we use for this analysis. Section IV examines the erosion of real tax losses across all fi rms and nine industry groups for selected tax years. Section V computes transition probabilities and steady state distributions of fi rms across various tax states. We use those results to compute the impact of tax asymmetry on effective tax rates across our nine industry groups for taxable and non-taxable fi rms. Section VI summarizes our fi ndings.
II. THE PARTIAL REFUNDING OF NET OPERATING LOSSES
Tax law provides two options to subchapter C corporations that report a net operating loss (NOL). If a fi rm has outstanding tax liability from the prior two tax years, then a fi rm may carry the NOL back to offset that liability.
1 If a fi rm is unable to exhaust the NOL through carryback, it then carries the NOL forward to be used as a net operating loss deduction (NOLD) against future taxable income. Net operating losses may be carried forward up to 20 years, at which time they expire. 2 Net operating losses acquired through mergers or acquisitions face certain restrictions that impede their use and make it unlikely that a fi rm could immediately utilize all such NOLs. 3 Currently, no OECD country that levies a corporate income tax allows full NOL refundability or even pays interest to maintain their real values. 4 Despite this universal treatment, the inherent fl aws of the partial refund system are well-known. In broad terms, the system suffers from three shortcomings that are related to a fi rm's inability to use NOLs immediately. The most conspicuous defi ciency is the real NOL erosion caused by delays in claiming carryforward deductions. Mintz (1988) fi nds that tax asymmetry produced signifi cant erosion and dispersion in the real value of tax losses recouped by Canadian fi rms; while most real taxes losses were recouped by retail trade fi rms (86 cents per dollar) and utilities (83 cents), manufacturers recouped little more than half (61 cents), and resource fi rms (e.g., mining) recouped less than one quarter (24 cents). Both Mintz and Auerbach and Poterba (1987) fi nd that partial refunding penalizes cyclical industries more heavily due to such delays.
A less transparent fl aw of partial refunding is the potential for marginal effective tax rate disparities between taxable and non-taxable fi rms. Because non-taxable fi rms might face higher or lower effective tax rates than their taxable counterparts, partial refunding might encourage or discourage investment depending on a fi rm's tax attributes, tax-life of investment and prospects for future profi tability. For example, non-taxable fi rms might face lower effective tax rates because loss carryforwards temporarily shield income generated by new investment. Such income is effectively taxed in a future year as the incremental income from the new investment reduces the stock of loss carryforwards. However, the positive effects of this tax shield might be (more than) offset by the simultaneous delay of depreciation and interest deductions.
A third fl aw of partial refunding is that it discriminates against risky investments, new fi rms, and undiversifi ed fi rms. A fi rm choosing between two projects with equal expected (pre-tax) returns will opt for the less risky project due to the potential reduc-tion in the real value of any tax loss that might be incurred and carried forward. New fi rms face higher expected effective tax rates because the taxing authority does not share in the loss if the fi rm fails, yet levies tax if the fi rm is profi table. Small, undiversifi ed fi rms might also face higher tax rates if they cannot use a NOL to offset taxable income from other investments.
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At the same time, tax asymmetry confers a number of valuable benefi ts to the taxing authority. An important implication of partial refunding is the ceiling imposed on fraud and abuse. Under full refundability, fi rms would enjoy unlimited and immediate benefi ts from the overstatement of tax losses. Because fi rms must use NOLs to offset profi ts, partial refunding limits fraud to actual tax liability. Other benefi ts include reduced revenue volatility and enhanced real tax receipts. Partial refunding stabilizes revenues because it acts as an imperfect income averaging mechanism. Real receipts are enhanced because many corporations never utilize NOLs or claim them after substantial delay. For tax years 1993 -2003 , Cooper and Knittel (2006 fi nd that full loss refundability would have reduced U.S. corporate income tax revenues by approximately one-third, whereas actual loss carryforward deductions and carryback refunds reduced revenues by only 15 percent during that time period.
In the analysis that follows, we use two metrics to gauge how partial refunding affects C corporations: real NOL erosion and effective tax rates. We do not attempt to address or quantify the many other ways that tax asymmetry might impact corporations. For example, loss considerations might have suffi cient import so that a fi rm opts for S-corporation status to allow the pass-through of any tax loss, thereby imposing a limit on the number and type of entities that can be shareholders of the fi rm. Alternatively, tax asymmetry might compel non-taxable fi rms to use complex leasing arrangements, whereas they would simply purchase the asset under full refunding. We also disregard other attributes that might affect our analysis, such as tax credits. The inclusion of tax credits would greatly increase the complexity of the analysis and distract from analyzing issues related solely to the partial refunding of NOLs.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The dataset for this analysis is a combination of two Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data fi les. The primary data source is the IRS annual corporate samples for tax years 1993-2004. The stratifi ed annual samples include detailed tax return data for 60,000-80,000 C corporations from a total population of approximately 2.1 million fi rms. The second data source is the CORTAX data fi le, which contains all post-fi ling amendments and adjustments initiated by fi rms or the IRS. For our purposes, CORTAX provides two useful pieces of information. CORTAX records when a fi rm applies for a carryback refund, the tax year to which the loss is applied, and the dollar amount of the refund. CORTAX also provides information regarding the status of fi rms that exit the annual corporate sample. If a fi rm does not fi le a tax return because it no longer conducts business under its former taxpayer identifi cation number, then CORTAX retains that number for up to 10 years, but leaves all other fi elds blank. By contrast, certain fi elds will contain values if the fi rm fi led a return, but was not included in the annual sample. We use this indicator to distinguish between fi rms that simply leave the annual sample for a given year from fi rms that no longer exist. The latter case occurs when a fi rm terminates operations or is acquired by another fi rm.
Our fi nal dataset can be sub-divided into three distinct groups. The primary group includes fi rms that are present for all tax years 1993-2004. This group generates most of the activity we observe. The second group includes fi rms that fi rst appear in the annual sample between tax year 1994 and tax year 2001 and appear every year thereafter. The third group includes fi rms that appear for at least three consecutive tax years, but then subsequently cease to fi le a return under that taxpayer identifi cation number due to termination or acquisition. The data do not allow us to differentiate between those two outcomes. Therefore, if we cease to observe a fi rm in our dataset, then we assume that the fi rm's stock of unused NOLs will never be used. This assumption understates NOL utilization because it is possible that some portion of any acquired NOL stock will be used during our study period. However, due to the restrictions placed on acquired NOLs, any understatement should be modest.
A. Corporate Dataset
Our dataset captures nearly three-quarters of total NOLs and loss carryforward deductions reported by all corporations during our study period (Table 1) . The (unweighted) dataset begins with 46,700 fi rms in tax year 1993, peaks at 67,600 in tax year 2001, and then declines to 52,800 by 2004. This trend is attributable to the fact that we capture new additions to the annual corporate sample only through tax year 2001, but we allow terminations and acquisitions through 2004. 6 Because small fi rms are not fully sampled, our unweighted dataset underrepresents small loss fi rms. The average loss for our dataset is $8.4 million, compared to $0.2 million for the corporate population. Although we cannot quantify how this omission affects our results, we surmise that small loss fi rms would experience similar or stronger negative repercussions from partial refunding due to their less diversifi ed operations and more limited ability to carryback losses. Because we capture a relatively high proportion of total reported NOLs, we do not attempt to control for fi rms omitted from our dataset.
Our study period covers a full business cycle, so we observe a dramatic increase, then decline, in reported NOLs for the corporate population and our dataset. From 1993 to 2001, total tax losses increased from $127 billion to $440 billion, then declined to $273 6 In addition, there is a large increase in the number of fi rms in our dataset from [1997] [1998] [1999] . During that time, the annual corporate sample increased from approximately 62,000 to 82,000 fi rms. The larger sample includes all mid-sized fi rms with assets between $10 million to $50 million or gross proceeds between $2.5 million to $10 million. Previously, those fi rms were sampled at a rate between 0.4-10 percent. 
B. Defi nitions and Methodology
For the purposes of this analysis, we defi ne a net operating loss as the excess of allowable deductions (including the dividends received deduction) over total income. The NOLs we examine are operating losses; they do not include capital losses.
8 Carryback refunds are NOLs used to offset tax liability from a prior tax year. Net operating loss deductions are loss carryforwards from prior tax years that are used as a deduction against current year income. Finally, we defi ne a non-taxable fi rm as a loss fi rm that does not immediately carry all losses back (full carryback fi rms are taxable at the margin) or a fi rm that uses loss carryforwards to eliminate at least 95 percent of current year tax liability. 9 We track how fi rms use NOLs beginning with tax year 1993 because it corresponds to the fi rst year that corporations reported NOL stocks on their tax return. The NOL stock is the cumulative amount of unused tax losses that fi rms carry forward into the tax year. If a fi rm reports a NOL stock carried into 1993, we require that the fi rm exhaust that stock prior to the utilization of any new NOLs. For each successive tax year, we re-compute the NOL stock brought forward by adding reported losses and deducting any carryback refunds or carryforward deductions from the original stock reported by the fi rm. We use CORTAX data to attribute carryback refunds to the loss year from which they originate. The attribution of loss carryforward deductions to a specifi c loss year is more complicated. For that purpose, we vintage and track a fi rm's NOL stock and attribute claimed loss carryforward deductions to the oldest NOLs carried in that inventory. This stacking order refl ects utilization patterns because NOLs will expire if unused.
In certain instances, fi rms will claim a loss carryforward deduction that exceeds our computed NOL stock carried into the tax year. These unexplained deductions may arise due to unobserved adjustments made to the original tax return (i.e., an amended tax return or audit) or if a fi rm acquires NOLs through a merger or acquisition. In either 7 For tax year 2005, NOLs decreased to $217 billion, then increased to $228 billion (2006) and $314 billion (2007) . 8 Capital losses can only offset capital gains. If the corporation cannot deduct a capital loss in the current tax year, it must carry the loss to other tax years and deduct it from any net capital gains that occur in those years. 9 We do not require that fi rms eliminate all tax liability because we observe a number of instances where fi rms leave a small amount of taxable income on their tax return, even though it appears they could eliminate all of it based on the size of their NOL carryforward stock. We are unsure why this outcome occurs. The elimination of this threshold has only a minor impact on our results. It is possible that these fi rms will in fact eliminate all taxable income when they fi le an amended return once the audit process is complete.
case, we cannot identify the tax year from which the loss deduction originates. We label these deductions "unexplained NOLDs" because it appears that the fi rm had insuffi cient stock to claim them. Unexplained NOLDs are held separate and are not included in our analysis; they comprise approximately one-tenth of all loss deductions we observe.
10
To the extent that unexplained NOLDs are attributable to the acquisition of a fi rm previously included in our dataset (hence we include their tax loss in our tabulations), we will understate NOL utilization. Otherwise, the omission of these deductions does not impact our results.
IV. THE EROSION OF REAL NET OPERATING LOSSES
We begin our analysis with an examination of the effect of tax asymmetry on the real value of tax losses. To quantify any erosion that occurs, we track how quickly fi rms use NOLs. We classify NOLs into one of three groups based on their ultimate disposition: (1) NOL used as a carryback refund or loss carryforward deduction (which may indicate that a portion of a NOL was used or the entire amount), (2) NOL lost, due to a termination or merger/acquisition, and (3) NOL remains to be used at a future time. Table 2 reports these outcomes and the number of years that transpire before fi rms in our dataset used NOLs.
Tax year 1993 is the fi rst year that our methodology can be used to attribute carryback refunds and carryforward deductions to the tax year from which they originate. For 1993, fi rms in our dataset had eleven years to utilize $71 billion of reported tax losses. We fi nd that slightly more than one-half of those NOLs were used as a carryback refund or carryforward deduction ($38 billion), slightly less than one-third were lost ($21 billion) and 16 percent ($11 billion) remain unused by the end of our study period. For later tax years, the share of NOLs used or lost generally declines over time, while the share unused increases due to the progressively shorter utilization window.
At the bottom of Table 2 , we track the usage of any pre-existing NOL stocks that fi rms reported in the fi rst year they appear in our dataset. For these amounts, we cannot identify the tax year from which loss carryforward deductions originate and we do not know the exact number of years that transpired before NOLs were used. The fi rst case relates to fi rms present in 1993 that reported $263 billion of NOL stock carried into that year. From 1993-2004, we fi nd those fi rms used $153 billion (58 percent) as a carryforward deduction, $92 billion (35 percent) was lost due to termination or acquisition, and $18 billion (7 percent) remains to be used by the end of tax year 2004. It is likely that much of this fi nal amount will expire unused. The second case relates to fi rms that fi rst appear between tax years 1994-2001 and report a NOL stock carried into the year we fi rst observe them. Those fi rms reported $163 billion of NOL stock. We fi nd that $73 billion (45 percent) of that stock was used as a carryforward deduction, $47 billion (29 percent) was lost, and $43 billion (26 percent) remains to be used. (1) Used NOLs equal to the sum of carryback refunds and loss carryforward deductions.
(2) Lost NOLs are stocks of NOLs that disappear due to fi rm termination or a merger/acquisition. (3) Pre-existing NOL stock brought forward into tax year 1993. Carryback refunds are not observable.
(4) Pre-existing NOL stock for fi rms that fi rst appear in our dataset after tax year 1993. Carryback refunds are not observable. Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text. Table 2 Disposition of Net Operating Losses ($ Billion)
NOL Used as Carryforward Deduction, Number of Years Until Used
Final NOL Disposition
The tabulations from Table 2 reveal that fi rms typically carried back 12-15 percent of their tax loss to offset liability from prior tax years. 11 We note that actual carryback potential appears considerably higher, but some fi rms may have opted to forgo carryback to avoid displacing a credit that was claimed previously.
12 Carryback refunds spiked in 2001-02 due to the Jobs Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and adverse economic conditions. The Jobs Creation Act temporarily extends the loss carryback window from two to fi ve years for NOLs generated in those years.
Although the utilization patterns from Table 2 suggest that most NOLs eventually claimed are used within three to four years of the tax loss, the table also shows that some fi rms endure lengthy delays. For example, fi rms claimed nearly one billion of carryforward deductions in 2004 that were attributable to tax year 1993. Such delays cause signifi cant erosion, but unused NOLs have a much greater impact on real values because a large share are never used and have no value. A simple extrapolation of our results illustrates this point. For tax years 1993-95, fi rms could carry NOLs forward fi fteen years. If one assumes that the declining utilization patterns for those years continue over the NOL's remaining tax life, then our results suggest that approximately two-fi fths of NOLs generated in those years would never be used.
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A. NOL Utilization by Industry
We divide our dataset into nine industry groups to more closely examine the implications of tax asymmetry across sectors for three tax years: 1993, 1996 and 1999. To facilitate comparisons across those years, we restrict the NOL utilization window to eight years. That is, we compare the share of losses claimed (i.e., the utilization rate) and the speed of those claims across sectors for up to eight years after the NOL was reported.
14 Table 3 presents our industry results. Across all fi rms, the share of NOLs utilized during the eight-year window declines from 51 to 40 percent. This result holds generally across all sectors, although utilities and fi nancials are exceptions. We fi nd considerable (1) Percentage of NOLs used during eight-year window that follows tax loss.
(2) Average age of NOLs used during eight-year window that follows tax loss. 
Table 3
Industry Utilization of Net Operating Losses ($ Billion) dispersion in utilization rates across sectors; rates range from 16 percent (the professional service sector for 1999) to 76 percent (the information sector for 1993). 15 The two sectors reporting the largest relative increase in NOLs (information and professional services) also experienced the largest relative decline in utilization rates. These sectors comprised 9 percent of NOLs for 1993 but nearly one-third for 1999. During that time, utilization rates fell by nearly half.
The fi nal three columns of Table 3 show the average number of years that transpired before fi rms claimed NOLs. For this computation, we assume that carryback refunds are claimed immediately (i.e., in year zero). Across all fi rms, the average vintage of NOLs ranged from 2.4-3.0 years. In general, the fi nancial and utility sectors claimed NOLs faster than the all-fi rm average, while the professional service sector was somewhat slower. We note that these average vintages relate only to NOLs claimed during our eight-year window. Had we extended our analysis to the full carryforward period, then we project that the average vintage would likely increase by 1.0-1.5 years.
B. NOL Utilization by New Firms
Several researchers, such as Mintz (1991) and Poddar (1991) , have surmised that tax asymmetry penalizes new fi rms disproportionately because they have limited or no ability to carry losses back and suffer higher failure rates than established fi rms. To test this hypothesis, we separate new fi rms from their older counterparts and reproduce the tabulations from Table 3 . We defi ne a new fi rm as a fi rm that is not more than fi ve years old based on the date of incorporation reported on the tax return for each of the three years we examine. We defi ne old fi rms as all other fi rms. Table 4 presents our new and old fi rm results. Across all sectors, the share of NOLs reported by new fi rms nearly doubled from 1993 (14 percent) to 1999 (27 percent). This trend was especially noticeable for the information and professional service sectors. Across the three years we examine, the average utilization rate for new fi rms was 17 percentage points lower than for old fi rms, with the largest difference recorded by the information sector (42 percentage points). The average NOL vintage for new fi rms was 1.4 years higher, with the information sector (2.7 years) again recording the largest difference.
C. Summary
Based on average utilization rates and vintages, our results imply that partial refunding causes signifi cant NOL erosion. A simple method to quantify this erosion is the computation of average refundabilities or net present values. The fi nal three columns of Table 4 Net (1) Average share of NOLs used during eight-year window that follows tax loss for tax years 1993, 1996 and 1999. (2) Average vintage of NOLs used during eight-year window that follows tax loss for tax years 1993, 1996 and 1999. (3) Projected real value of NOL recouped per dollar of loss. Calculations assume a discount rate of 6 percent. Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text.
Table 4
New Versus Old Firm Net Operating Loss Utilization show these amounts. Using a discount rate of 6 percent, average NOL refundability is 85 cents per dollar based on the 2.7 years that all fi rms required, on average, to claim NOLs. However, this fi gure signifi cantly understates erosion because it disregards any carryforward deductions claimed outside our eight-year window as well as NOLs never used. To incorporate those omissions, we assume that if we had lengthened the utilization window to capture the full NOL tax life, then average vintages would increase by 1.25 years. We also gross-up our average utilization rates from Table 4 by 25 percent to capture additional NOLs used in years nine through fi fteen (1993 and 1996) or years nine through twenty (1999), as well as NOLs eventually used but acquired through mergers or acquisitions, which we generally count as lost. This gross-up increases the all-fi rm average utilization rate to 57 percent, and we assume that the residual share is never used and has no value. These two adjustments reduce average refundability to 46 cents per dollar across all fi rms. Non-durable manufacturers (65 cents) and utilities (62 cents) had the highest average refundability, while the professional service sector recouped the lowest amount (26 cents). Applying these same adjustments against our new fi rm results, average refundability across all fi rms was considerably lower (30 cents), ranging from 58 cents (in the transportation sector) to 21-22 cents (in the wholesale-retail and information sectors) per dollar of tax loss. The decline in NOL utilization rates shown in Table 3 suggests that the negative repercussions of tax asymmetry may have intensifi ed over time. Yet, two factors might prove that trend to be transient. We fi nd that losses reported by new fi rms increased nearly four-fold between 1993-1999 and those fi rms had considerably lower NOL utilization rates. It is unclear whether the corporate sector will continue to experience such a large infl ux of new loss fi rms in future years. Adverse economic conditions in 2001-02 also had a negative impact on utilization rates for 1999 NOLs. For these reasons, it is premature to speculate on whether the cumulative effect of tax asymmetry has grown over time due to an ever-increasing stock of unused NOLs. It is possible that the time period we examine is atypical. We would expect a similar decline in utilization rates for recent NOLs due to the 2008-09 recession.
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One fi nal interesting result from the tabulations in this section is the relatively high utilization rate (58 percent) associated with the $263 billion of NOL stock brought forward into tax year 1993 ( Table 2 ). Although that stock is an amalgam of losses that could potentially come from tax years 1981-1992, our dataset suggests that approximately three-quarters of that amount is attributable to carryforwards from the 1990-92 recession and recovery years, since those NOLs were largely unused by 1993. Although we do not explicitly calculate utilization rates for 1990-92 NOLs, if we apply plausible assumptions based on our results from this section, then we project an average utiliza-tion rate of roughly 66 percent for 1990-92 NOLs, somewhat higher than the adjusted average utilization rate we use to compute average refundabilities across all fi rms (57 percent). This result might suggest that NOL utilization rates are related to the business cycle. Net operating losses generated during recession years might have higher utilization rates because the recession is an exogenous demand shock to fi rms that are typically profi table. Those fi rms soon regain their taxable status and utilize NOLs. By contrast, NOLs reported in recovery or boom years might be attributable to less effi cient fi rms unable to use them quickly (or ever). Unfortunately, the time period we examine does not allow a more rigorous test of this hypothesis, because it covers only a few years after the 2001-02 recession. Moreover, the temporary opening of the carryback window for 2001-02 NOLs makes comparisons diffi cult since the tax law is not held constant.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TAX ASYMMETRY FOR EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
As noted previously, the implications of tax asymmetry for the investment decision are not immediately clear. Partial refunding might raise or lower the marginal effective tax rate on investment, depending on a fi rm's current tax characteristics, future tax status, method of fi nance, and the tax life of the investment. Non-taxable fi rms might face effective tax rates that are quite different than their taxable counterparts if they are unable to quickly regain their taxable status. In order to assess the implications of tax asymmetry for investment, we fi rst examine how rapidly fi rms transition between taxable and non-taxable status. We then use those transition probabilities to compute the expected present value of tax payments, pre-and post-tax internal rates of return, and effective tax rates for taxable and non-taxable fi rms.
A. Persistence of Tax Status
The tabulations from Table 1 reveal that approximately one-third of fi rms in our dataset report a NOL in a typical year. Because loss fi rms are generally smaller than their profi table counterparts, our unweighted dataset overstates their relative importance for average transition probability and effective tax rate computations. Therefore, we reweight all fi rms using total income. 17 Total income is equal to the sum of gross receipts, rents, royalties, dividends, interest, capital gains and other income reported by fi rms on the corporate income tax return. This re-weighting scheme reduces the number of non-taxable fi rms by approximately one third. For ease of exposition, we continue to refer to the number of fi rms that transition between taxable and non-taxable status, as opposed to the share of total income, as is implied by our re-weighting scheme.
Following Auerbach and Poterba (1987) and Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) , we compute transition probabilities using a simple second-order Markov process to generate a fi rm's expected tax status, where the current and prior year status contain all the information needed to determine a fi rm's transition prospects for the following year. The second-order process has eight possible outcomes. In two outcomes, a fi rm maintains its original status through year three as a persistently taxable (TTT) or non-taxable (NNN) fi rm. The remaining six outcomes are a mixture of the taxable and non-taxable states. Because we use this simple process to compute transition probabilities, we assume that the marginal investment project is not large enough to affect future tax status. Thus, we assume that future tax status is independent of marginal investment decisions, and is not known with certainty. Rather, it is determined by a fi rm's stochastic income stream, which is a function of the return to prior investments.
In Table 5 , we present (weighted) transition probabilities for fi rms that are persistently taxable and non-taxable. The column headings denote the fi rst year of the three-year period we examine. Over time, we fi nd that taxable and non-taxable persistence were relatively stable, although we do observe an increase in non-taxable persistence and a corresponding decline in taxable persistence for 1999, where the 2001 recession year is the third "outcome" year. We also fi nd modest differences in average persistence across industries. Compared to the 1993-2002 average for all fi rms (in the fi nal column), the fi nancial sector (-6.4 percentage points) exhibits less non-taxable persistence while the information (7.5 percentage points) and professional service (6.3 percentage points) sectors exhibit more. For taxable persistence, only the transportation sector (-6.8 percentage points) was noticeably different from the all-fi rm average.
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B. Transition Paths to Steady State Distributions
We use our average transition probabilities to determine when a fi rm currently taxable or non-taxable could be expected to remit a future accrued tax liability. Once we compute the distribution of expected tax payments associated with each accrued tax liability over the life of a marginal investment, we can then compute effective tax rates to compare the impact of tax asymmetry on taxable and non-taxable fi rms.
Following the methodology and notation used by Auerbach and Poterba (1987) , we defi ne the term Π t N s T as the probability that a fi rm that is non-taxable in year t regains taxable status in year t + s. For example, Π 1 NNNT is the probability that a fi rm non-taxable in year 1 will be non-taxable for two more years before transitioning to taxable status. We use the term q t ij to represent the probability that a fi rm is in one of four possible states based on its prior and current year tax status: TT, TN, NT and NN. For a fi rm that Table 5 Second-Order Markov Transition Probabilities (1) Average probability that a fi rm non-taxable (N) for two consecutive years remains non-taxable in the third year. Column headings represent fi rst year.
(2) Average probability that a fi rm taxable (T) for two consecutive years remains taxable in the third year. Column headings represent fi rst year.
Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text. = 0. The probability that a fi rm will be taxable in year 1 is then equal to the probability of the fi rm being in one of two states:
where P TTT represents the probability that a fi rm that is taxable for two years will maintain that status in the third year, and P TTN represents the probability that the fi rm will transition to non-taxable status in the third year. Using this equation, the distribution of future states (q t ij
) and probability of taxable status can be built up recursively based on the initial state in year 0 and the relevant transition probabilities. For example, the probability that a fi rm carries its taxes from the investment year forward exactly one year is equal to Π In this manner, the probabilities associated with longer non-taxable spells can be computed recursively. We can then distribute an accrued tax liability that would be paid in year t if the fi rm were taxable over all future years, based on the probability that a fi rm that is non-taxable in year t will fi rst transition to the taxable state and remit any tax due.
In the steady state, given that q NT must equal q TN and that the probabilities of the four possible states must sum to one, the steady state distribution of fi rms implied by our computed transition probabilities can be computed as follows: q NN = q NT * (1 -P TNT ) / P NNT; q NT = q TN = 1 / (2 + P NTT / (1 -P TTT ) + (1 -P TNT ) / P NNT ), and q TT = q TN * P NTT / (1 -P TTT ). In Table 6 , we show the average transition probabilities used to compute the steady state distribution of fi rms across possible states. We note that these average transition probabilities refl ect a full business cycle and that each of the ten three-year periods we examine (see Table 5 ) receives equal weight. Across all fi rms, our computations show that 30 percent of fi rms will be non-taxable in the steady state (NN plus TN) , with nearly half of the professional service sector in that state, but less than one-fi fth of the fi nancial sector. These non-taxable shares are somewhat higher than the shares we actually observe in our re-weighted dataset, as the average share of non-taxable fi rms across all years is approximately 23 percent. This discrepancy occurs because our transition probabilities overstate long-term, non-taxable persistence since they do not capture the fact that persistently non-taxable fi rms are more likely to fail and will not continue in that state forever. 19 Despite this difference, we use the implied transition paths to steady state distributions for our analysis because they are consistent with our computed transition probabilities. (1) Average probability that a fi rm non-taxable (N) for two consecutive years remains non-taxable in the third year.
(2) Computed steady-state distribution of fi rms that are non-taxable (N) for two consecutive years. Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text.
At the bottom of Table 6 , we show computations for new fi rms. As expected, new fi rms generally exhibit more non-taxable persistence and less taxable persistence. Those results are refl ected in the much higher share of new fi rms that are non-taxable in our computed steady state (54 percent). Especially notable is the large share of fi rms in that state for the professional service sector (71 percent).
C. Derivation of Eff ective Tax Rates
We defi ne the effective tax rate as the difference between the internal rate of return for expected pre-tax cash fl ows (ρ) and expected post-tax cash fl ows (r) divided by the internal rate of return for expected pre-tax cash fl ows:
If an asset has an economic depreciation rate equal to δ, then an investment made in year 0 would yield a gross return in year t equal to (ρ + δ) (1 -δ)
t-1 per dollar of investment. Assuming that the investment is equity fi nanced and generates no income in the year of investment, the fi rm's tax liability in year 0 (B 0 ) would equal the tax depreciation allowance multiplied by the statutory tax rate (a negative tax liability) and for years after the investment, the accrued tax liability for each year t would equal:
where τ is the statutory corporate tax rate, D t is the nominal depreciation allowance and i is the rate of infl ation.
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If losses were fully refundable, then accrued tax payments would equal actual tax payments as depicted by (3). The marginal project's post-tax internal rate of return (r) would then be defi ned by the following:
where T(r) represents the present value of tax payments (including those made in year 0). For the marginal investment, (4) shows that the net present value of income less the initial cash outlay must equal the net present value of taxes, so that the fi rm just "breaks even" on the investment. If the tax system does not allow for the immediate refund of losses, then actual tax payments will differ from (3), and (4) must be amended before effective tax rates can be computed. Under this scenario, each accrued tax liability gives rise to a distribution of expected tax payments because a fi rm may not be taxable when the tax liability attributable to the new investment accrues. For example, consider a non-taxable fi rm in year zero that does not transition to taxable status until year fi ve. We have assumed that the marginal investment does not affect future tax status. In this example, the change in taxable income in years zero to four is not effectively realized until year fi ve. For years zero to four, the incremental change to taxable income in each year merely reduces or augments the fi rm's carryforward stock dollar-for-dollar so that the incremental taxable income for each year would be effectively taxed in the year when the fi rm transitions to taxable status, which also corresponds to the year the fi rm exhausts any loss carryforward stock.
For each sector, we use our computed transition probabilities to project when a fi rm beginning from a particular state could be expected to pay an accrued tax liability. For illustrative purposes, consider a fi rm that is non-taxable for the current and prior year (NN). In Table 7 , we show how accrued tax liabilities are spread forward over time for this fi rm based on our computed transition probabilities. 21 These fi gures depict the pattern of fi rms' fi rst transition to taxable status from year zero. For example, the "all fi rms" column shows that non-taxable fi rms will remit none of the accrued tax liability from year zero during that year, 15.6 percent (P NNT ) will be remitted in year one, and 13.2 percent ((1 -P NNT )*P NNT ) in year two. By the end of year four, the probability that a fi rm will transition to taxable status and remit tax is approximately one-half. Corresponding fi gures for new fi rms are shown on the bottom half of the table. For new fi rms in certain industries (information and professional services), non-taxable persistence is so high as to delay more than one half of tax payments by 15 years or more.
The transition patterns from Table 7 are only relevant for tax liability attributable to year zero, the year of investment. For all future periods, we must also account for the fact that the distribution of fi rms among our four possible states (NN, NT, TN and TT) changes as the originally taxable or non-taxable fi rm in a future accrual period may be in any one of those four states. Therefore, in order to transform tax accruals after year zero into expected tax payments, we use the contemporaneous distribution of fi rms among the four states to determine the probability of future taxable status. We then use the incremental transition of fi rms from non-taxable to taxable status from that year forward to spread expected tax payments.
To this point, we have only accounted for delays in tax payments due to losses or the elimination of tax liability via loss carryforwards. We have not explicitly accounted for the interaction between projected future tax payments and loss carrybacks. When carrybacks are allowed, then each future tax payment increases a fi rm's ability to carry back future tax losses, thereby reducing tax liability. Following Auerbach and Poterba (1987) , we use the term ν ts to represent the shadow value of incremental tax payments made in year t + s attributable to their possible use as an offset against future losses. A more detailed explanation of the ν ts term is provided in the appendix. This term is gen- Table 7 Distribution of Years Until First Passage to Taxable erally modest, ranging from 0.05-0.10 for most sectors, because most loss carrybacks would have eventually been used as a carryforward deduction, so that the net effect of allowing future carrybacks is relatively small. With this modifi cation, the expected present value of tax payments is:
The second part of (5) represents the expected present value of a one dollar tax accrual in year t. T(r) is defi ned by (5) which is then substituted into (4) to compute effective tax rates.
D. Empirical Results
Table 8 presents our marginal effective tax rate computations. We consider two types of investment. The fi rst investment represents general industrial equipment with a seven-year tax life (MACRS depreciation, mid-year convention) and an economic depreciation rate of 12.25 percent, based on Hulten and Wykoff (1981) . We set the rate of infl ation equal to 3 percent, the statutory tax rate to 35 percent, the pre-tax return to 6 percent and the real discount rate equal to 3 percent for purposes of computing the shadow value of carrybacks (ν ts ). The second investment represents industrial buildings with a 39.5-year tax life (MACRS depreciation, mid-year convention) and economic depreciation of 3.61 percent. Finally, we assume that investments are equity fi nanced and risk free so that the income produced by the investments is known with certainty. Only the fi rm's future tax status is uncertain.
For our computations, we examine three types of fi rms: (1) a hypothetical fi rm under full loss offset, (2) a fi rm that is non-taxable in the prior and current year (NN), and (3) a fi rm that is taxable in the prior and current year (TT). Under full loss offset, the effective tax rate on equipment (25.4 percent) is less than the statutory rate because tax depreciation is more generous than economic depreciation (i.e., it has a higher net present value given our infl ation assumption) and this tax rate is the same across all sectors. Under partial refunding, the effective tax rate falls by approximately 1 percentage point for non-taxable fi rms and 5.6 percentage points for taxable fi rms. The non-taxable fi rm faces a higher rate because the delay from realizing depreciation deductions more than offsets the benefi t from delaying payment of tax on incremental income. Across sectors, rates fall most dramatically for industries where partial refunding imposes the longest non-taxable spells (information and professional services). We fi nd an inter-industry difference of approximately 7.5 percentage points for both taxable and non-taxable fi rms, and a maximum differential of 11.9 percentage points between non-taxable fi rms in the fi nancial sector (26.7 percent) and taxable fi rms in the professional service sector (14.8 percent).
For structures, the effective tax rate (48.2 percent) under full loss offset exceeds the statutory rate because tax depreciation is less generous than economic depreciation.
Under partial refunding, effective tax rates fall and the average rate for non-taxable fi rms (39.6 percent) is lower than the average rate for taxable fi rms (43.0 percent). For structure investments, non-taxable fi rms benefi t relatively more from tax asymmetry because the gain from delaying payment of tax on incremental income exceeds the disadvantage from the inability to immediately use depreciation allowances. In general, we obtain that result for investments where tax depreciation is less generous than economic depreciation, given the other assumptions that we make. We fi nd inter-industry differentials of 10.8 percentage points for non-taxable fi rms and 7.4 percentage points for taxable fi rms, and a maximum differential of 13.0 percentage points between taxable fi rms in the fi nancial sector (45.6 percent) and non-taxable fi rms in the professional service sector (32.7 percent).
Although we derive modest effective tax rate differentials for equity-fi nanced investments, we derive larger differentials if equipment investment is partially debt fi nanced and signifi cant differentials if fi rms can utilize an investment tax credit (ITC) that allows carryforwards. If the investment is 50 percent debt fi nanced, then the effective tax rate Table 8) . 22 Under a 10 percent ITC with a 50 percent basis offset, we derive a 19.3 percentage point differential in effective tax rates for equipment investment between taxable and non-taxable fi rms. Partial refunding penalizes non-taxable fi rms because the ITC benefi t is front-loaded in the investment year. Finally, if we double our assumed rate of infl ation from 3 to 6 percent, then effective tax rates increase for the hypothetical fi rm under full loss offset because deprecation allowances are further eroded. Effective rates increase somewhat less for taxable and non-taxable fi rms under partial refunding because the present value of future expected tax payments is also eroded.
We do not derive effective tax rates for new fi rms because the simple model we employ is not suffi ciently complex to capture the unique characteristics of those fi rms. Had we simply extended our methodology to new fi rms and used the results from Tables 6 and  7 , we would derive lower effective tax rates across all industries for equipment and structures investment because new fi rms are closer to existing in a perpetual non-taxable state. Our simple modeling does not capture the fact that a much higher proportion of new fi rms will likely fail, as opposed to enduring very long non-taxable spells, and it is unclear how we should treat that outcome in our computations. Moreover, our modeling does not allow for the fact that similar investment projects could be much riskier (i.e., uncertain) for new fi rms compared to established fi rms. When we allow for greater uncertainty, it is no longer known if the fi rm will survive and remit any tax. Under that scenario, the taxing authority will not share in any tax loss and so fi rms will face considerably higher expected effective tax rates.
A simple example illustrates this point. Assume a new fi rm invests in a "standalone" investment. That is, the fi rm has no other investments so that any loss incurred cannot be used until a future year when the fi rm becomes profi table. Assume further that if the investment is not profi table, then the fi rm fails and any tax losses are never effectively used. Finally, assume that the fi rm expects two possible outcomes that are equally likely: a pre-tax return of 15 percent and -5 percent. In this simple example, the fi rm's expected return is 5 percent and if the fi rm pays tax at 35 percent, its expected tax is $2.63 on a $100 investment, an expected tax rate of 53 percent. Our stylized model would not refl ect that outcome because we assume that future income streams are known and that fi rms do not expire with unused tax losses. When we allow for the possibility of unprofi table investments and fi rm failure, much higher expected effective tax rates would result.
VI. CONCLUSION
Using a large, unbalanced panel of tax returns for 1993-2004, we examine the implications of tax asymmetry for U.S. corporations. Due to our limited time horizon, we look at NOL utilization over an eight-year window for tax years 1993, 1996 and 1999 . For those years, we fi nd an average NOL utilization rate of 47 percent across all fi rms. If we adjust for NOLs used outside our eight-year window and merger/acquisition NOLs, then we project that average utilization rates were likely closer to 55-60 percent. For reasons we note, it is possible that the time period used for this analysis might be unusual, so that "typical" NOL utilization rates might be somewhat higher.
Due to the inability to use NOLs, as well as delays in claiming them, the average fi rm in our dataset recouped somewhat less than one-half of the real value of their tax loss. We fi nd considerable dispersion in NOL utilization rates and average refundabilities across sectors. Across all fi rms, we fi nd an average refundability of 46 cents per dollar of tax loss, ranging from 26 cents (professional services) to 65 cents (non-durable manufacturing). In general, sectors with modest start-up costs (e.g., professional services, information, other services) had low utilization rates and experienced greater NOL erosion due to a large infl ux of new loss fi rms. By contrast, sectors dominated by large, established fi rms (e.g., manufacturing and utilities) reported higher NOL utilization rates and experienced less erosion.
We divide our dataset between old and new fi rms to examine whether new fi rms bear the burden of tax asymmetry disproportionately. For the time period we examine, we fi nd that new fi rms have lower NOL utilization rates, higher NOL vintages and lower average refundability compared to their older counterparts. We estimate that average NOL refundability was 30 cents per dollar of tax loss for new fi rms and 50 cents for established fi rms.
To examine the implications of these results for investment decisions, we compute transition probabilities using a second-order Markov process to generate a fi rm's expected tax status, and we use those probabilities to compute effective tax rates. We fi nd modest effective tax rate differentials between taxable and non-taxable fi rms within our 9 industry sectors but somewhat larger differentials between sectors. Effective tax rate differentials increase further when we allow for debt fi nancing and investment tax credits. Due to limitations in our modeling technique, we do not compute effective tax rates for new fi rms. However, due to their higher likelihood of failure and greater uncertainty of outcomes, it is likely that new fi rms face considerably higher expected effective tax rates for new investment projects compared to established fi rms.
Our results confi rm that certain fi rms and industries bear the negative repercussions of tax asymmetry disproportionately. In order to alleviate this disparity, policymakers might consider two changes to the tax code. First, interest could be paid on NOLs to preserve their real value over time. This approach was recommended, in the context of a business cash fl ow tax, in the report of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) . As noted in the report, the provision of interest on NOL carryforwards mitigates the negative effects of partial refunding, especially for fi rms undertaking projects expected to have negative cash fl ows for several years. The payment of interest prevents the erosion of any depreciation or interest deductions that cannot be claimed immediately, thereby preserving their value and reducing effective tax rates. However, we note that this proposal could have non-trivial revenue implications, given that recent corporate tax data show that fi rms carried an NOL stock of $1.3 trillion into tax year 2006. Methods to mitigate the revenue cost of such treatment might include providing interest on NOLs on a prospective basis only and the reduction of the carryforward window from 20 to 15 years. Our results suggest that only a very small fraction of NOLs are ever used in years 16-20, when the effect of interest compounding would be greatest.
Another method of increasing NOL utilization is to allow fi rms to carryback NOLs without credit displacement. Currently, fi rms that carry NOLs back might displace a tax credit because loss carrybacks must be claimed prior to the application of any tax credits. Displaced credits can be carried back one year from the displacement year, but if they are not carried back, then they must be carried forward and the fi rm might need to recompute credits and fi le amended returns for various tax years. Under this proposal, fi rms would be allowed to carryback NOLs to offset any remaining fi nal tax liability post-credits and would not need to displace credits. We observe many instances in our dataset where large fi rms appear to forgo NOL carryback when it is available. Many of those fi rms claimed signifi cant general business and/or foreign tax credits. Although the data do not allow us to test whether the presence of a credit caused fi rms to forgo carryback, it seems to be a plausible explanation in these cases.
APPENDIX: INCORPORATION OF LOSS CARRYBACKS FOR EFFECTIVE TAX RATE COMPUTATIONS
Following the methodology and notation used by Auerbach and Poterba (1987) , this appendix describes the procedure used to account for loss carrybacks in our effective tax rate computations. When a fi rm makes a tax payment, that payment has value to the fi rm because it can be used to offset losses reported in the following two tax years. The current value to the fi rm is less than the present value of any such refunds because some portion (on average) of the carryback would have been used eventually as a carryforward deduction.
Defi ne ν TT as the expected carryback value of a one dollar tax payment made in the second year for a fi rm in state TT. Defi ne ν NT in a similar fashion. Let ω TN represent the present value of the future deductions foregone when a NOL is realized (i.e., carried back). The value of ν TT is the expected present value of the carrybacks associated with a one dollar tax payment and is equal to: P NNT . We use these shadow values to compute the expected present value of tax liabilities. To account for fi rms' ability to carry back NOLs, we multiply each of the expected tax payments generated by the no-carryback scenario by either (1 -ν TT ) or (1 -ν NT ), depending on the fi rm's tax status. When a fi rm accrues a tax liability with a distribution of expected tax payments over many periods, the contemporaneous value of q TT determines the fraction of the expected tax payment which will be paid immediately in a state following a taxable year. This amount is multiplied by (1 -ν TT ). All of the remaining components associated with this accrued tax liability are multiplied by (1 -ν NT ), since they occur in states where the fi rm will have just re-entered taxable status. In the notation from the paper, this implies the following: These equalities can be substituted into (5) to evaluate the internal rate of return, r, and the effective tax rate.
